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In this study, we investigate the movements of the nominal effective exchange rates 
(NEER) of East Asian currencies and the Asian Monetary Unit (AMU), which is the 
weighted average of East Asian currencies, during the course of the global financial 
crisis. We found that the NEER were more stable in countries that adopted the currency 
basket system even during the financial crisis. Comparisons made between the NEER 
and a combination of the AMU and AMU Deviation Indicators show intra-regional 
exchange rates among the East Asian currencies, and that there have been strong 
relationships between them before and after the global financial crisis. Accordingly, 
monitoring both the AMU and the AMU Deviation Indicators is effective in stabilizing 
the NEER of East Asian currencies. In this respect, our findings indicate that the AMU 
Deviation Indicators as well as the AMU will play a very important role in the 
surveillance of the stability of intra-regional exchange rates. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The global financial crisis that started in the United States in the summer of 2007 
has had a great impact on domestic as well as Asian economies. The crisis also raised 
the possibility of growing production networks in East Asia undergoing large-scale 
restructuring. Large currency fluctuations, not only against the US dollar but also 
against currencies of neighboring countries, are undesirable for Asian countries. It is 
essential to transition into a system that stabilizes intra-regional exchange rates within 
Asia while allowing those values to fluctuate against the US dollar and the euro in order 
to determine the economic impact of exchange rate fluctuations on intra-regional trade.   
In this paper, we present a report of our investigation on the movements of nominal 
exchange rates, nominal effective exchange rates (NEER) of East Asian countries, and 
the Asian Monetary Unit (AMU), which is the weighted average of Asian currencies, as 
proposed by Ogawa and Shimizu (2005), during the course of the recent global financial 
crisis. We focus on analyzing the differences among these three kinds of exchange rate 
data in order to determine what kind of currency regime is desirable to stabilize the 
NEER for each of the East Asian currencies affected by the financial crisis. In addition, 
we investigate the relationships among the NEER, the AMU, and the AMU Deviation 
Indicators for each of the East Asian countries, which have been studied by Ogawa and 
Shimizu (2005).   
The AMU is the weighted average of East Asian currencies while the AMU 
Deviation Indicators show how much each of the East Asian currencies deviates from a 
benchmark rate in terms of the AMU. Both the AMU and the AMU Deviation Indicators 
are considered measurements for surveillance under the Chiang Mai Initiative and 
coordinated exchange rate policies of East Asian countries. If the movements of the   3
AMU Deviation Indicators for each of the East Asian currencies are strongly related to 
their NEER, monitoring the indicators and keeping them within a certain band is 
considered to be an effective exchange rate policy for the region. Ogawa and Shimizu 
(2006) have already investigated the relationships among the NEER, the AMU, and the 
AMU Deviation Indicators. In this paper, we extend the sample period to include the 
period of the global financial crisis in order to conduct the same analysis to determine 
possible changes in the relationships among these three factors. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 contains an overview of 
previous research on desirable currency regimes in East Asian countries; Section 3 
investigates Asian currency movements during the global financial crisis; Section 4 
focuses on the volatilities of the NEER of each of the East Asian currencies, so as to 
compare the relationships between their weights of the effective exchange rates in East 
Asian countries and their currency regimes; Section 5 investigates the relationships 
among the NEER, AMU, and AMU Deviation Indicators for each of the East Asian 
currencies; Section 6 describes how to use the AMU Deviation Indicators to promote 




2. What is a desirable currency regime for East Asia? 
 
Although the Asian currency crisis of 1997 taught us the important lesson that the 
de facto dollar peg is dangerous for East Asian countries, the monetary authorities of 
these countries still tend to choose this system rather than the currency basket peg 
system. As McKinnon (2000) and Ogawa (2002, 2008) pointed out, the link of East   4
Asian countries with the US dollar has continued even after the Chinese currency 
regime reform of July 2005.
1 Ogawa (2008) presented empirical results showing that 
the monetary authority of China continues to stabilize the Chinese yuan against the US 
dollar despite making announcements of adopting a managed floating exchange rate 
system with reference to a currency basket, while links between the home currency and 
a currency basket are found in some East Asian countries. Such a coordination failure 
regarding exchange rate policies among the authorities of the East Asian countries can 
increase the volatility and misalignments of the intra-regional exchange rates of their 
currencies. 
With the growing dependency of intra-regional trade in East Asian countries, what 
is essentially needed is a currency system that reduces exchange rate risks in 
international trade and investments within the region. One way to achieve this is to 
create a common currency basket through the joint efforts of the monetary authorities of 
all East Asian countries. Ogawa and Shimizu (2005) proposed the AMU as the weighted 
average of thirteen East Asian currencies (the ASEAN countries along with China, 
Japan, and South Korea) and developed AMU Deviation Indicators for a surveillance 
process under the Chiang Mai Initiative. The AMU Deviation Indicators are used as a 
benchmark so that the monetary authorities of the East Asian countries can coordinate 
regarding the exchange rate policies such that each of the East Asian currencies do not 
deviate from the common currency basket or the AMU. In this way, the countries can 
achieve stability of intra-regional exchange rates with joint floating against outside 
currencies, which include the US dollar and the euro.   
Some East Asian countries such as Singapore, China, and Malaysia (from July 
                                                  
1  Ogawa and Ito (2000) regarded these movements as a kind of coordination failure.   5
2005), actually adopted a currency system near the BBC rule.
2 As an indicative 
proposal, Ogawa and Shimizu (2007) presented a step-by-step approach to move from 
the individual currency basket system to a common currency basket system in East Asia. 
Ma and McCauley (2008) also discussed that intra-Asian exchange rate stability might 
be based on similar national policies of managing currencies against their respective 
baskets.  
On the other hand, McKinnon (2005) proposed the so-called “East Asian dollar 
standard” according to which East Asian countries should coordinate their policies to 
keep their exchange rates stable against the US dollar. He described the collective 
macroeconomic consequences of all East Asian governments individually opting to peg 
to the US dollar. According to McKinnon, East Asian countries should coordinate their 
policies to keep their exchange rates stable against the US dollar. McKinnon and 
Schnabel (2009) also suggested that China should rigidly maintain the nominal peg of 
the Chinese yuan to the US dollar in order to maintain monetary and financial stability. 
In a normal period, most of the Asian currencies are strongly correlated with the 
US dollar and are, in other words, stable vis-à-vis the US dollar. However, in 
comparison, these currencies fluctuate vis-à-vis the euro and the Japanese yen. 
Accordingly, their effective exchange rates are not stable. The Bank of Thailand clearly 
states on their website that they aim to ensure the value of the Thai baht under the 
condition of “maintaining national competitiveness, as measured through not just the 
US Dollar but the nominal effective exchange rate, which includes currencies of 
important trading partners for Thai economy.” 
                                                  
2  The BBC rule, where BBC stands for basket, band, and crawling, proposed by Williamson (2000), 
is the pegging of a currency to the central rate of a currency basket (basket) within a pre-determined 
band from a central rate (band) and adjusting its central rate in order to neutralize inflation 
differential (crawling).   6
After the bankruptcy of the Lehman Brothers on September 15, 2008, a number of 
Asian currencies sharply depreciated vis-à-vis the US dollar, with the Japanese yen and 
the Chinese yuan being notable exceptions. The monetary authorities of East Asian 
countries have recognized that stability against the US dollar is no longer enough for 
their economies. They should now determine which option is more desirable for the 
regions⎯to stabilize their exchange rates against the US dollar or against a currency 
basket. Moreover, they should also consider coordinating their exchange rate policies 
with each of the other East Asian countries as a way to make progress. 
 
 
3. Exchange rate movements during the global financial crisis 
 
Let us begin by studying the latest movements in Asian currencies vis-à-vis the US 
dollar. Figure 1 shows the index of Asian currencies vis-à-vis the US dollar (January 
2008 = 100) from January 2008 to March 2009. Since September 2008, Asian 
currencies have been depreciating sharply against the US dollar as a result of the sell-off 
of local currencies accompanying the capital outflows related to deleveraging by US 
and European financial institutions. The only exception has been the Japanese yen, 
which has appreciated substantially against the US dollar. The Chinese yuan has stayed 
relatively stable in this period due to its strong relationship with the US dollar. Evidently, 
China’s monetary authority adopted a de facto dollar peg policy.The Singapore dollar 
and the Malaysia ringgit have also not depreciated largely against the US dollar due to 
their currency basket system. The South Korean won has had a larger depreciation than 
any other Asian currency. Other Asian currencies, particularly the Thai baht, have also 
lost value due to the subprime crisis and fallout from the Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy.     7
Next, we compare the volatilities of the AMU, which is the weighted average of 
East Asian currencies, and each East Asian currency vis-à-vis the US dollar, the euro, 
and the Japanese yen. We calculate the standard deviation of the daily nominal 
exchange rates by year. All of the exchange rates have been downloaded from 
Datastream, while the AMU is available on the RIETI.
3 Figure 2 shows the volatilities 
of nominal exchange rates vis-à-vis the US dollar. Basically, there are large fluctuations 
in floating currencies (the Japanese yen, the South Korean won, the Indonesian rupiah) 
and comparatively small fluctuations in de facto US dollar-pegged currencies (the 
Chinese yuan) and currency basket-pegged currencies (the Singapore dollar). The 
standard deviation of the AMU is the second lowest in 2006-2008. Most of the East 
Asian currencies fluctuate more against the US dollar than the AMU, with the exception 
of the Chinese yuan.   
Figure 3 shows the volatilities of nominal exchange rates vis-à-vis the euro. As a 
whole, the volatilities of Asian currencies vis-à-vis the euro are higher than those 
vis-à-vis the US dollar. The AMU is the second lowest while the Singapore dollar was 
the lowest. The fluctuation of the Malaysian ringgit is also relatively lower compared 
with other East Asian currencies. Figure 4 shows the volatilities of nominal exchange 
rates vis-à-vis the Japanese yen. In this case, the AMU is the lowest relative to the East 
Asian currencies while the Chinese yuan is the second lowest.   
As a whole, we can summarize the above results as follows: the volatilities of the 
exchange rates of East Asian currencies vis-à-vis the three major currencies increased 
sharply in 2008. However, there were comparatively smaller fluctuations in currency 
basket-targeted currencies (the Singapore dollar and the Malaysian ringgit) especially 
                                                  
3  RIETI is the Research Institute of Economy, Trade, and Industries. Daily data on the AMU and the 
AMU Deviation Indicators is freely available on the RIETI website (http://www.rieti.go.jp/).   8
vis-à-vis the euro and the Japanese yen, with the volatilities of the AMU being lower 
than most of the East Asian currencies. 
 
 
4. The NEER of East Asian currencies 
 
In this section, we investigate movements in the NEER of the East Asian 
currencies. Monthly data on the NEER are downloaded from BIS (2005 = 100). Figure 
5 shows the movements in the NEER of the East Asian currencies from January 2000 to 
March 2009. Figure 5 tells us that the NEER of the Chinese yuan has fluctuated even 
before the Chinese currency regime reform in July 2005. Since mid-2007, the NEER 
started to fluctuate more widely for most of the East Asian countries. Since September 
2008, the NEER of the Japanese yen and the Chinese yuan have appreciated sharply 
while that of the South Korean won has depreciated dramatically.   
Why did the NEER of some East Asian currencies exhibit such a volatile 
fluctuation during the global financial crisis? In order to answer this question, we must 
begin with checking the weights on the effective exchange rates of trade-counter 
countries. Figure 6 shows the weights of an effective exchange rate for the East Asian 
currencies in 2005–2007, according to BIS statistics.
4 As Ma and McCauley (2008) 
pointed out, we find that patterns of the weights in effective exchange rates are similar 
among all the East Asian currencies. Weights on the US dollar are between 12.1% in 
Indonesia and 21.0% in China. Weights on the euro are between 16.1% in Indonesia and 
24.1% in China. Weights on the East Asian currencies (the Japanese yen, the Chinese 
yuan, the HK dollar, the South Korean won, the ASEAN currencies, and the Taiwanese 
                                                  
4  BIS revises the effective exchange rate weights every two years.   9
dollar) are between 47.1% in Japan and 68.63% in Taiwan. The weight on the East 
Asian currencies is the lowest in China (40.7%) because this does not include a weight 
on its home currency. We also observe that the weight on the US dollar is not the 
highest for all of the East Asian currencies. The weight on the euro is the highest for the 
Chinese yuan. The weight on the Chinese yuan (and the HK dollar) is the highest for the 
Japanese yen, the South Korea won, and the Taiwanese dollar. The weight on the 
Japanese yen is the highest for the Thai baht, the Philippine peso, and the Hong Kong 
dollar. The weight on the ASEAN currencies is the highest for the Singapore dollar, the 
Malaysian ringgit, and the Indonesian rupiah. These results indicate that the weights of 
the East Asian currencies are high for the East Asian currencies. It means that their 
effective exchange rates might be stable if their intra-regional bilateral exchange rates 
are stable against each other.   
We now investigate the relationships between the weights on East Asian currencies 
in terms of their effective exchange rates and the volatilities of the NEER for each of the 
East Asian currencies. To do so, we plotted a scatter diagram with the extent of the 
volatilities of the NEER (on a monthly basis) on the vertical axis and the effective 
exchange rate weights on East Asian currencies on the horizontal axis. The volatility of 
the NEER is calculated as a standard deviation of the monthly data on the NEER. We 
divided the sample period into two sub-sample periods⎯a normal period from January 
2000 to December 2006 and the period of the global financial crisis from January 2007 
to March 2009.   
Figure 7 shows the results of this analysis. In the normal period, we can find no 
clear relationship between the weights on the East Asian currencies in the NEER and the 
volatilities of the NEER. However, during the period of the global financial crisis, the   10
volatilities of the NEER were smaller than 5% when the weights on the East Asian 
currencies in the NEER were approximately above 60%, with the exception of the 
Indonesian rupiah. Furthermore, the volatilities of the NEER were approximately above 
7% when the weights on the East Asian currencies in the NEER were smaller than 55%. 
This implies that when the weights on the East Asian currencies in the NEER are higher, 
the volatilities of the NEER become lower. In other words, the NEER of East Asian 
currencies with high weights on the US dollar and the euro were relatively more volatile 
than those of the others. 
Next, we investigate how the currency regime affects the volatilities of the NEER. It 
is often said that the currency regimes vary among the East Asian countries. We 
compare the volatilities of the NEER in the normal period with those during the global 
financial crisis and thereby investigate their relationships with the currency regimes. 
Table 1 shows the current exchange rate policy of East Asian countries. Only the 
monetary authority of Hong Kong has adopted the hard peg system or “currency board.” 
Five countries have adopted a managed floating exchange rate system while three 
countries have adopted a free floating exchange rate system. However, these 
classifications only show their de jour currency regime. In order to find out their de 
facto currency regime, we apply the estimation methodology of Frankel and Wei (1994), 
which estimates the coefficients of the implicit basket weights of each East Asian 
currency on three anchor currencies⎯the US dollar, the euro, and the Japanese yen.
5 
The estimated equation is as follows: 
ε + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + = Sfr JPY Sfr Euro Sfr USD Sfr i e a e a e a a e / 3 / 2 / 1 0 / & & & & ,  
                                                  
5  Frankel and Wei (2007) confirmed that the de facto regime in China remained pegged to the dollar 
throughout 2005. However, they indicated that there was a modest but steady increase in flexibility 
subsequently.   11
where  Sfr i e / &  is the rate of change in the daily exchange rate of the currency i in terms 
of the Swiss franc, which is a numeraire currency.
6 The value  / USD Sfr e &  is the rate of 
change in the daily exchange rate of the US dollar in terms of the Swiss franc,  / Euro Sfr e &  
is the rate of change in the daily exchange rate of the euro in terms of the Swiss franc, 
and  / JPY Sfr e &   is the rate of change in the daily exchange rate of the Japanese yen in terms 
of the Swiss franc. 
In the above equation, the coefficients a1, a2, a3 are interpreted as weights of the 
three anchor currencies in an implicit basket peg system. If these coefficients are 
significantly estimated and they are positive then it means that currency i pegs to a 
basket of the three major currencies. If only the coefficient a1 is significantly estimated 
and close to one whereas all others are not significant then it is identified that the 
currency i pegs to the US dollar. In this way, we analyzed nine East Asian currencies 
(the five ASEAN currencies, the Chinese yuan, the South Korean won, the Hong Kong 
dollar, and the New Taiwan dollar). The sample period was from January 2007 to the 
end of May 2009. We estimated the above equation every six months, so a total of five 
sub-sample periods were analyzed. All daily exchange rates were derived from 
Datastream.  
The results are presented in Table 2. We found that the Chinese yuan was still 
pegged to the US dollar even after China announced its exchange rate reforms in July 
2005. Its coefficients of the US dollar were 98% during the sample period, except for 
the second sub-sample period (July 2007 to December 2007), and its size of adjusted 
R-squared was also very high. These results indicate that the Chinese yuan has 
                                                  
6  When analyzing the Asian currencies, the Swiss franc is usually used as a numeraire currency.   12
continued its strong linkage with the US dollar even during the global financial crisis. 
All other East Asian currencies, except for the Indonesian rupiah and the South Korean 
won, also showed a strong linkage with the US dollar with US dollar coefficients above 
80% during the financial crisis. On the other hand, the Singapore dollar pegged to a 
currency basket with the US dollar and the euro throughout the sample period. Except 
for the Chinese yuan and the Hong Kong dollar, the other East Asian currencies pegged 
to a currency basket with the US dollar and the euro in most of the sub-sample periods. 
Some of the Japanese yen’s coefficients were significantly estimated; however, most of 
them were negative.   
From the above results, we can see how the de facto currency regime affects the 
volatilities of the NEER. Figure 8 shows the scatter diagram that indicates the 
relationship between the de facto currency regime and the volatilities of the NEER. The 
vertical axis indicates the size of the volatilities of the NEER (on a monthly basis) while 
the horizontal axis indicates the de facto currency regime arranged from a hard peg (the 
Hong Kong dollar) to a free floating exchange rate system (the Japanese yen). Between 
the Hong Kong dollar and the Japanese yen, we see the rest of the East Asian currencies 
arranged by size of US dollar coefficient. 
In the normal period (January 2000 to December 2006), the volatility of the NEER 
of the Singapore dollar was at its lowest. The volatilities of the NEER of the US 
dollar-pegging countries such as Hong Kong, China, and Taiwan were higher than 
Singapore. The volatilities of the NEER of the free-floating countries were higher than 
those of the other countries. During the global financial crisis (January 2007 to March 
2009), the volatilities of the NEER of the Japanese yen, the South Korean won 
(free-floating countries), and the Chinese yuan increased. It is noteworthy that the   13
volatility of the NEER of the Singapore dollar did not change. Additionally, the 
volatilities of the NEER of the Malaysian ringgit, the Thai baht, and the New Taiwan 
dollar decreased. This implies that the currency basket system could keep the NEER 
stable or lower even during the global financial crisis.   
Considering these results collectively, we found that the NEER of the country 
whose effective exchange rate’s weights on the East Asian currencies are high (Taiwan 
and Hong Kong) and that executes a currency basket system (Singapore, Malaysia, 
Thailand, and Taiwan), which was stable during the global financial crisis. However, 
those countries whose effective exchange rate’s weight on the US dollar and the euro 
are relatively high (like Japan, China, and South Korea) should adopt a currency basket 
type exchange rate policy in order to stabilize their NEER.   
 
 
5. The relationship between the NEER, the AMU, and the AMU Deviation 
Indicators  
 
Ogawa and Shimizu (2005) proposed the creation of an Asian Monetary Unit 
(AMU) as the weighted average of all East Asian currencies and calculated AMU 
Deviation Indicators that show how much each of the East Asian currencies deviates 
from a benchmark rate in terms of the AMU. Both the AMU and the AMU Deviation 
Indicators are considered to support coordinated exchange rate policies in East Asia. 
Ogawa and Shimizu (2006) investigated the relationship between the NEER of the 
AMU composite currencies and the AMU and AMU Deviation Indicators. If the 
movements of the AMU Deviation Indicators are strongly related to their NEER, 
monitoring these indicators and keeping them within a certain band is considered to be   14
an effective exchange rate policy in the region. Ogawa and Shimizu (2006) used data 
during the sample period from January 1999 to December 2004 and found strong 
relationships between the AMU Deviation Indicators and the effective exchange rates, 
except in the case of some currencies.
7 
In this study, we extended the sample period to include the period of the global 
financial crisis and conducted the same empirical analysis. We regressed the monthly 
percentage change of the NEER on the monthly percentage change of the AMU and the 
monthly difference of its AMU Deviation Indicator for each of the East Asian currencies 
to investigate how the movement of the AMU and each AMU Deviation Indicator 
explains the movement in the NEER for each of the East Asian currencies.
8 We 
estimated the following regression equation: 
 
 
We divided the entire sample period (1/2000-3/2009) into two sub-sample periods: the 
normal period (January 2000 to December 2006) and the period of the global financial 
crisis (January 2007 to March 2009). 
Table 3 shows the results of this analysis. Both the coefficient of the AMU and the 
AMU Deviation Indicators are significant and positive. The adjusted R-squared are also 
high in both sub-sample periods. Even in the global financial crisis period, the 
coefficients of the AMU and the AMU Deviation Indicators are significant and positive. 
                                                  
7  In Ogawa and Shimizu (2006), the coefficients of the AMU are significant and positive for the 
Japanese yen and the Chinese yuan, and the coefficients of the AMU Deviation Indicator are positive 
and significant for the eight East Asian currencies. 
8  We conducted this regression analysis not in level but in percent change because the data on 
nominal effective exchange rates, the AMU, and the AMU Deviation Indicator is not stationary in 
level but is stationary in percent of change (in 1st difference for the AMU Deviation Indicator). We 
transposed the data on the AMU Deviation Indicators into first difference since they are quoted in 
terms of percent of change. 
) ( ) (log ) (log 0 0 0 i i AMUDI AMU EER Δ ⋅ + Δ ⋅ + = Δ α α α  15
In China, Indonesia, Japan, and South Korea, the coefficients of the AMU Deviation 
Indicators are higher during the global financial crisis than during the normal period. 
These results imply that a coordinated exchange rate policy by monitoring the AMU and 




6. Coordinated exchange rate policies with the AMU and the AMU 
Deviation Indicator 
 
How can we promote coordinated exchange rate policies by using the AMU and 
the AMU Deviation Indicators? Ogawa and Shimizu (2007) proposed the following 
step-by-step approach to achieve regional monetary coordination: 
•  Step 1: 
¾  Policy dialogue about exchange rates and exchange rate policies 
¾  Surveillance using the AMU and the AMU Deviation Indicators in economic 
reviews and policy dialogues   
•  Step 2: 
¾  Establishing a managed floating exchange rate system with reference to an 
individual currency basket   
¾  Surveillance using the AMU Deviation Indicators 
We have recognized that policy dialogue especially concerning coordinated exchange 
rate policies in East Asian countries are needed in order to achieve regional policy 
coordination. Under the current circumstances, however, it is difficult to even begin this 
process because the governments of these countries do not agree on the coordinated   16
exchange rate policies. So do we need a policy consensus at all? Some East Asian 
countries have already adopted the individual currency basket system, as mentioned in 
the previous section. In addition, we found that the NEER of these currencies were 
stable even during the global financial crisis. As Ma and McCauley (2008) pointed out, 
coordination is not a necessary condition to reduce intra-Asian currency volatilities; the 
first and second steps might be executed now if each of the monetary authorities are to 
adopt a policy that keeps their own effective exchange rates stable. 
For example, we can show a coordinated exchange rate policy by using the AMU 
Deviation Indicators. Figure 9 shows the movement of the AMU Deviation Indicators 
from January 2000 to March 2009. When we determined +/-15% as a fluctuation band 
of the AMU Deviation Indicators, which is the same as the currency band of the 
Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) under the European Monetary System (EMS) after 
1992 and the ERM II, except for the Danish crone, we found that all of the East Asian 
currencies except for the Philippine peso and the Lao kip fell within the band from 2000 
to mid-2005. This means that the exchange rates of the East Asian currencies were 
naturally managed within the band without any coordinated exchange rate policies. 
However, since 2006, the AMU Deviation Indicator of the South Korean won has 
started to appreciate beyond the uppermost band level of 15%, while at the same time 
the AMU Deviation Indicator of the Japanese yen has fallen below zero. The AMU 
Deviation Indicators of the Thai baht and the Singapore dollar have also followed the 
South Korean won.   
What motivated those currencies to deviate from the benchmark? It is found that 
yen carry trades between the Japanese yen and the appreciating currencies destabilized 
the AMU Deviation Indicators (Ogawa and Yoshimi (2009)). These phenomena suggest   17
that coordinated monetary policies should also be considered along with coordinated 
exchange rate policies. Table 4 shows the latest policy interest rate and money market 
rate (for 3 months) in East Asian countries. There are still large differences between the 
lowest country (Japan) and the highest country (Indonesia). However, the differences 
between the 3 months’ rates are reducing due to the latest global financial crisis. This is 
a good opportunity to discuss coordinated monetary policies as well as the coordinated 





In this study, we investigated the movement of nominal exchange rates, the NEER 
of East Asian currencies, and the AMU during the recent global financial crisis. We 
found that the volatilities of the exchange rates of the East Asian currencies vis-à-vis the 
three major currencies increased sharply in 2008. However, there are comparatively 
small fluctuations in basket-pegged currencies especially vis-à-vis the euro and the 
Japanese yen. Moreover, the volatilities of the AMU were mostly lower than those of 
the East Asian currencies. We also found that the NEER of most of the East Asian 
currencies have started to fluctuate since 2007. Since September 2008, the NEER of the 
Japanese yen and the Chinese yuan have increased sharply while the NEER of the South 
Korean won has depreciated dramatically. The relationship between the NEER’s 
volatilities and weights on the East Asia currencies in terms of the effective exchange 
rate suggests that when the weights on the East Asian currencies are higher, the 
volatilities of the NEER reduce. We also found that a currency basket system could 
stabilize the NEER even during a global financial crisis.     18
An analysis of the relationship between the NEER, the AMU, and the AMU 
Deviation Indicator showed a strong relationship between the NEER of East Asian 
currencies and the AMU and AMU Deviation Indicators. These relationships remained 
largely unchanged during the global financial crisis. Accordingly, monitoring both the 
AMU and the AMU Deviation Indicators is effective in stabilizing the NEER of the East 
Asian currencies.   
Under current circumstances, the individual basket system is desirable for Asian 
countries. Because weights in the NEER are more or less similar among all the East 
Asian currencies, a similar policy of stabilizing the home currency against their NEER 
can, for a while, lead to a coordinated exchange rate policy without any consensus. In 
the future, however, coordinated monetary policies should also be considered with the 
coordinated exchange rate policies. 
Turmoil in the U.S. financial markets is still expected to have significant impacts 
on East Asian countries. Although the direct impact of the global financial crisis was 
relatively small in East Asia, the region has begun experiencing significant subprime 
mortgage fallout with domestic economies affected by declining exports to the United 
States, falling stock prices, and so forth. Sudden changes in capital flows caused by the 
global financial crisis have had a large effect on foreign exchange rates as well. Under 
these circumstances, it is necessary to keep a close eye on foreign exchange rate 
movements. What must also be kept in mind are currency measurements in terms of 
effective exchange rates rather than focusing solely on their nominal exchange rate 
vis-à-vis the US dollar. In this respect, the AMU Deviation Indicators, which show 
intra-regional exchange rates among the East Asian currencies, play a very important 
role.   19
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Foreign Exchange Volatilities vis-à-vis the US dollar











AMU 0.22% 0.22% 0.23% 0.19% 0.22% 0.23% 0.19% 0.17% 0.31%
China 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.13% 0.07% 0.10% 0.14%
Indonesia 1.00% 1.34% 0.71% 0.44% 0.53% 0.75% 0.62% 0.40% 0.90%
Japan 0.62% 0.62% 0.62% 0.51% 0.61% 0.53% 0.49% 0.60% 1.04%
South Korea 0.55% 0.52% 0.59% 0.56% 0.39% 0.43% 0.40% 0.29% 1.67%
Malaysia 0.00% 0.01% 0.02% 0.03% 0.02% 0.15% 0.39% 0.29% 0.44%
Philippines 0.61% 0.87% 0.41% 0.39% 0.19% 0.26% 0.41% 0.48% 0.60%
Singapore 0.22% 0.28% 0.27% 0.26% 0.29% 0.28% 0.24% 0.23% 0.48%
Thailand 0.48% 0.30% 0.45% 0.31% 0.26% 0.29% 0.39% 0.85% 0.72%
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008  22


































Source : Datastream 
(Author’s calculations.) 
Foreign Exchange Volatilities vis-à-vis the euro









AMU 0.78% 0.70% 0.49% 0.54% 0.58% 0.46% 0.41% 0.35% 0.82%
China 0.72% 0.69% 0.55% 0.59% 0.64% 0.55% 0.47% 0.36% 0.86%
Indonesia 1.31% 1.59% 0.82% 0.70% 0.76% 0.86% 0.69% 0.48% 1.31%
Japan 0.97% 0.82% 0.63% 0.62% 0.68% 0.50% 0.47% 0.66% 1.29%
South Korea 0.99% 0.92% 0.72% 0.76% 0.68% 0.54% 0.56% 0.41% 1.64%
Malaysia 0.72% 0.69% 0.55% 0.59% 0.64% 0.56% 0.58% 0.39% 0.83%
Philippines 0.97% 1.15% 0.61% 0.70% 0.63% 0.56% 0.58% 0.58% 0.93%
Singapore 0.74% 0.70% 0.52% 0.53% 0.53% 0.46% 0.42% 0.33% 0.70%
Thailand 0.89% 0.76% 0.59% 0.59% 0.60% 0.51% 0.53% 0.92% 1.05%
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Foreign Exchange Volatilities vis-à-vis the Japanese yen







AMU 0.43% 0.43% 0.42% 0.35% 0.40% 0.33% 0.34% 0.48% 0.84%
China 0.62% 0.62% 0.62% 0.51% 0.61% 0.51% 0.49% 0.61% 1.05%
Indonesia 1.13% 1.50% 0.90% 0.62% 0.70% 0.84% 0.75% 0.76% 1.40%
South Korea 0.76% 0.68% 0.72% 0.67% 0.61% 0.52% 0.57% 0.68% 2.13%
Malaysia 0.62% 0.62% 0.62% 0.51% 0.61% 0.55% 0.57% 0.68% 1.14%
Philippines 0.91% 1.02% 0.68% 0.62% 0.59% 0.52% 0.60% 0.77% 1.22%
Singapore 0.58% 0.54% 0.47% 0.43% 0.45% 0.37% 0.37% 0.68% 1.19%
Thailand 0.70% 0.58% 0.65% 0.48% 0.52% 0.44% 0.54% 1.06% 1.27%
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008  23














Figure 5. The NEER of East Asian Currencies 
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Figure 6. BIS Effective Exchange Rate Weights (2005-2007) 
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Figure 6 (continued) 










































   25












Figure 6 (continued) 















(Source: BIS)   26
Figure 7. NEER Volatilities and NEER Weights in Asia 
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(Author’s calculations)   27
Figure 8. NEER Volatilities and the De-facto Currency Regime 
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(Author’s calculations)   28
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Hong Kong Currency Board lowest
Taiwan Managed Float (reference to a currency basket)
China Managed Float (reference to a currency basket)
Malaysia Managed Float (reference to a currency basket)
Thailand Managed Float
South Korea Managed Float
Philippines Free Float
Indonesia Free Float
Japan Free Float highest
Source: Central Bank website
Exchange rate policy 
 Table 2.   
Country
 1/02/2007 to  6/29/2007
Variable Coef. Std.dev. Coef. Std.dev. Coef. Std.dev. Coef. Std.dev. Coef. Std.dev. Coef. Std.dev. Coef. Std.dev. Coef. Std.dev. Coef. Std.dev.
C -0.0195 *** (0.0075) 0.0192 (0.0364) 0.0015 (0.0192) -0.0077 (0.0204) -0.0380 (0.0333) 0.0040 (0.0133) -0.1024 (0.0741) 0.0037 (0.0030) 0.0074 (0.0160)
USD 0.9857 *** (0.0267) 0.7650 *** (0.1292) 0.7725 *** (0.0680) 0.8647 *** (0.0724) 0.8316 *** (0.1182) 0.7660 *** (0.0472) 1.1783 *** (0.2629) 0.9935 *** (0.0107) 0.8935 *** (0.0567)
EURO -0.0305 (0.0485) 0.6350 *** (0.2343) 0.3468 *** (0.1233) 0.4590 *** (0.1312) 0.3162 (0.2142) 0.3246 *** (0.0855) -0.5599 (0.4765) -0.0202 (0.0194) 0.0902 (0.1028)
JPY -0.0213 (0.0179) -0.1031 (0.0865) -0.0454 (0.0455) -0.0124 (0.0485) -0.0401 (0.0791) 0.0651 *** (0.0316) 0.2233 (0.1760) -0.0091 (0.0072) 0.0113 (0.0379)
Adj. R2 0.9495 0.4258 0.6947 0.7322 0.4533 0.8381 0.2204 0.9918 0.7919
7/02/2007  to 12/31/2007
Variable Coef. Std.dev. Coef. Std.dev. Coef. Std.dev. Coef. Std.dev. Coef. Std.dev. Coef. Std.dev. Coef. Std.dev. Coef. Std.dev. Coef. Std.dev.
C -0.0270 ** (0.0104) 0.0423 (0.0328) 0.0223 (0.0284) -0.0104 (0.0249) -0.0788 (0.0506) -0.0347 (0.0195) -0.0449 (0.0763) -0.0014 (0.0044) -0.0069 (0.0129)
USD 0.9231 *** (0.0276) 0.7789 *** (0.0875) 0.8256 *** (0.0756) 0.6483 *** (0.0663) 0.8602 *** (0.1348) 0.7723 *** (0.0520) 0.8448 *** (0.2035) 0.9933 *** (0.0116) 0.9515 *** (0.0345)
EURO 0.0412 (0.0469) 0.5280 *** (0.1486) 0.5694 *** (0.1285) 0.7523 *** (0.1126) 0.4425 * (0.2290) 0.3629 *** (0.0883) 0.0093 (0.3457) 0.0019 (0.0198) 0.0620 (0.0586)
JPY -0.0013 (0.0165) -0.0243 (0.0523) 0.0450 (0.0452) 0.0614 (0.0396) -0.0138 (0.0805) -0.1395 *** (0.0310) -0.2348 * (0.1216) 0.0001 (0.0070) -0.0177 (0.0206)
Adj. R2 0.9355 0.5984 0.7040 0.7223 0.4048 0.7772 0.1502 0.9893 0.9080
1/01/2008 to 6/30/2008
Variable Coef. Std.dev. Coef. Std.dev. Coef. Std.dev. Coef. Std.dev. Coef. Std.dev. Coef. Std.dev. Coef. Std.dev. Coef. Std.dev. Coef. Std.dev.
C -0.0473 *** (0.0107) -0.0142 (0.0252) 0.0809 (0.0574) -0.0106 (0.0471) 0.0524 (0.0651) -0.0281 (0.0244) 0.0852 (0.0951) 0.0006 (0.0041) -0.0480 (0.0260)
USD 0.9835 *** (0.0205) 0.9455 *** (0.0480) 1.0752 *** (0.1093) 0.8688 *** (0.0897) 0.9911 *** (0.1241) 0.7705 *** (0.0465) 0.9683 *** (0.1811) 0.9864 *** (0.0078) 0.9614 *** (0.0496)
EURO -0.0408 (0.0348) 0.1145 (0.0816) 0.3174 * (0.1857) 0.1483 (0.1524) 0.0352 (0.2108) 0.2099 *** (0.0789) 0.0103 (0.3077) -0.0058 (0.0133) 0.0863 *** (0.0842)
JPY 0.0166 (0.0180) 0.0357 (0.0422) -0.1829 * (0.0960) 0.1571 ** (0.0788) 0.2622 ** (0.1090) -0.0800 * (0.0408) 0.1919 (0.1591) 0.0102 * (0.0069) -0.0410 (0.0436)
Adj. R2 0.9760 0.8858 0.6555 0.6835 0.5914 0.8476 0.3700 0.9965 0.8738
 7/01/2008 to 12/31/2008
Variable Coef. Std.dev. Coef. Std.dev. Coef. Std.dev. Coef. Std.dev. Coef. Std.dev. Coef. Std.dev. Coef. Std.dev. Coef. Std.dev. Coef. Std.dev.
C -0.0078 (0.0123) 0.1389 (0.1081) 0.0167 (0.1839) 0.0230 (0.0384) 0.0125 (0.0488) -0.0026 (0.0414) 0.0167 (0.0260) -0.0041 (0.0035) 0.0413 (0.0284)
USD 0.9879 *** (0.0152) 1.1242 *** (0.1338) 0.5987 *** (0.2276) 0.8573 *** (0.0475) 0.8068 *** (0.0604) 0.7524 *** (0.0512) 0.8718 *** (0.0322) 0.9914 *** (0.0044) 0.8632 *** (0.0352)
EURO 0.0325 (0.0204) 0.0360 (0.1793) 1.2976 *** (0.3050) 0.2116 *** (0.0637) 0.4580 *** (0.0809) 0.3496 *** (0.0687) 0.1447 *** (0.0431) 0.0014 (0.0058) 0.1859 *** (0.0471)
JPY -0.0129 (0.0105) 0.0084 (0.0920) -0.2048 (0.1566) -0.0203 (0.0327) 0.0253 (0.0415) -0.0834 ** (0.0352) -0.0005 (0.0221) 0.0053 * (0.0030) -0.0133 (0.0242)
Adj. R2 0.9824 0.4866 0.2256 0.8244 0.7667 0.7614 0.9133 0.9986 0.8965
1/01/2009 to 5/29/2009
Variable Coef. Std.dev. Coef. Std.dev. Coef. Std.dev. Coef. Std.dev. Coef. Std.dev. Coef. Std.dev. Coef. Std.dev. Coef. Std.dev. Coef. Std.dev.
C 0.0007 (0.0034) -0.0621 (0.0704) 0.0168 (0.1266) 0.0194 (0.0445) 0.0021 (0.0461) 0.0133 (0.0439) -0.0110 (0.0242) 0.0001 (0.0014) -0.0002 (0.0358)
USD 0.9831 *** (0.0049) 0.8620 *** (0.0999) 0.7491 *** (0.1794) 0.8613 *** (0.0631) 0.9788 *** (0.0654) 0.8459 *** (0.0622) 0.8294 *** (0.0343) 0.9970 *** (0.0020) 0.8619 *** (0.0508)
EURO 0.0067 (0.0072) 0.0098 (0.1475) 0.4415 * (0.2650) 0.2767 *** (0.0931) 0.1673 * (0.0966) 0.2152 ** (0.0919) 0.1339 *** (0.0506) -0.0009 (0.0030) 0.1896 ** (0.0750)
JPY 0.0011 (0.0040) -0.0586 (0.0813) -0.2806 * (0.1462) -0.1377 *** (0.0514) -0.1119 ** (0.0533) -0.0542 (0.0507) 0.0145 (0.0279) 0.0021 (0.0017) -0.0749 * (0.0413)
Adj. R2 0.9987 0.5585 0.1980 0.7575 0.7905 0.7752 0.9235 0.9998 0.8375
Author's calculation. Autuor's calculation. Significance level: *90%, **95%, ***99%.
China Indonesia Korea Malaysia Philippines Singapore Thailand Hong KongT a i w a n
 
 Table 3. Relationship between the NEER, the AMU, and the AMU Deviation Indicators 
Sample period 1/2000-12/2006 obsevations 83
Variable Coef. Std.error Coef. Std.error Coef. Std.error Coef. Std.error
C -0.0324 (0.0260) -0.0014 (0.0542) -0.0242 (0.0231) -0.0153 (0.0289)
DLOG(AMU) 0.6405 *** (0.0366) 0.4326 *** (0.0633) 0.5803 *** (0.0304) 0.4445 *** (0.0372)
D(AMUDI) 1.4079 *** (0.0338) 1.0342 *** (0.0172) 1.1228 *** (0.0201) 0.9843 *** (0.0249)
Adj. R2 0.9561 0.9788 0.9859 0.9725
Sample period 1/2007-3/2009 obsevations 27
Variable Coef. Std.error Coef. Std.error Coef. Std.error Coef. Std.error
C -0.0740 (0.1270) 0.0602 (0.1096) 0.0670 (0.1129) 0.0816 (0.0993)
DLOG(AMU) 1.1124 *** (0.1710) 0.3362 ** (0.1508) 0.5017 ** (0.2169) 0.4192 *** (0.1347)
D(AMUDI) 1.5831 *** (0.1357) 1.1621 *** (0.0398) 1.2862 *** (0.0643) 1.0979 *** (0.0324)
Adj. R2 0.8383 0.9722 0.9738 0.9813
Autuor's calculation. Significance level: *90%, **95%, ***99%.
China Indonesia Japan South Korea




Sample period 1/2000-12/2006 obsevations 83
Variable Coef. Std.error Coef. Std.error Coef. Std.error Coef. Std.error
C -0.0094 (0.0183) 0.0234 (0.0320) -0.0089 (0.0207) -0.0165 (0.0333)
DLOG(AMU) 0.4783 *** (0.0252) 0.3258 *** (0.0367) 0.4171 *** (0.0257) 0.3127 *** (0.0392)
D(AMUDI) 1.1854 *** (0.0237) 1.1390 *** (0.0224) 0.9812 *** (0.0337) 0.9367 *** (0.0317)
Adj. R2 0.9694 0.9694 0.9145 0.9151
Sample period 1/2007-3/2009 obsevations 27
Variable Coef. Std.error Coef. Std.error Coef. Std.error Coef. Std.error
C 0.0525 (0.0886) 0.0967 (0.0819) 0.1396 * (0.0766) -0.0427 (0.1949)
DLOG(AMU) 0.4774 *** (0.1239) 0.3451 *** (0.1102) 0.3402 *** (0.1209) 0.4911 * (0.2623)
D(AMUDI) 0.7914 *** (0.0836) 1.0488 *** (0.0469) 0.5515 *** (0.0796) 0.2563 *** (0.0769)
Adj. R2 0.7723 0.9507 0.6431 0.3133
Autuor's calculation. Significance level: *90%, **95%, ***99%.
Malaysia Philippines Singapore Thailand
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Table 4. Policy Rate and 3-month Market Rate 
2.25 1year Deposit Rate
5.31 1year Lending Rate
Indonesia 7.25 Bank Indonesia Rate  8.22 JIBOR
Japan 0.10 Target O/N call rate 0.567 TIBOR
South Korea 2.00 BOK Base Rate 2.41 KORIBOR
Malaysia 2.00 O/N Policy Rate 2.12 KLIBOR
4.50 BSP O/N Borrowing Rate
6.50 BSP O/N Lending Rate
Singapore 0.5 SIBOR
Thailand 1.25 1day Repurchase Rate 1.425 BKIBOR





3 month Market Rate
1.207 SHIBOR
3.688 PHIBOR
 
 